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THE PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE 
– A SOLUTION AND A CRITIQUE
ABSTRACT
In this paper I will deal with the solution to the problem of cognitive 
significance offered by the so-called new theorists of reference, as well 
as with the critique of that solution given by Howard Wettstein. I will 
claim that the answer to this critique provided by John Perry is not 
sufficiently convincing. First, I will clarify some relevant concepts in order 
to present the problem of cognitive significance in a clear manner. Then 
I will expose the solution to the problem offered by Perry and David 
Kaplan. After that, I will present Wettstein’s critique of that solution. 
Subsequently, I will also analyze Perry’s attempt to defend against this 
critique. Finally, I will discuss the extent to which Perry’s attempt is 
successful. It will be shown that it is significantly not so.
The problem of cognitive significance
The concept of cognitive significance should explain the existence of the various cog-
nitive states in which we find ourselves in, as well as the difference between them. 
When we speak of cognitive states, we will most commonly speak of beliefs. They 
are manifested in the subject’s inclination to accept certain sentences as true in 
certain contexts. The content of cognitive states – the so-called cognitive content 
– we shall call a proposition. Hence John’s belief that Socrates is mortal manifests 
itself in John’s inclination to accept sentence “Socrates is mortal” as true, and that 
sentence expresses the proposition that Socrates is mortal.
A few remarks should be given here. First of all, for the time being, a proposition 
should be understood just as the content of our cognitive states – what we believe 
is the case for example, i.e. what we accept as true. We will soon talk more about 
what exactly is a proposition, and what is its relation with cognitive significance. 
Regarding the relation between propositions and cognitive significance, it should 
also be mentioned that we are not supposing here that propositions must be the 
bearers of cognitive significance. We will see that this presupposition is accepted by 
some, but not by all the philosophers who deal with the problem of cognitive sig-
nificance. Finally, in this paper we will mostly focus on the cognitive significance of 
sentences which include indexicals, like personal and demonstrative pronouns, etc.
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After these introductionary remarks we can move on to the problem of cogni-
tive significance itself. It is best to begin this by showing the three curious types of 
cases in which the concept of cognitive significance should have a major explana-
tory role. We get these types of cases once we describe what Wettstein calls Frege’s 
riddles, or Frege’s data, but without accepting an assumption which Gottlob Frege 
accepts, according to which propositions must be the bearers of cognitive signifi-
cance (Wettstein 1986: 186, 188).
The cases which belong to the first type are those in which a subject sincere-
ly and reflectively accepts as true – or is inclined to accept as true – a sentence 
which includes a certain indexical which, in that given context, has no referent. 
Let us take Wettstein’s example. A soldier in an enemy’s prison camp has a halu-
cination of a fellow soldier who has come to save him and he says – thinking that 
he is talking to that soldier – “You are wonderful”. In this context the term “you” 
has no referent, because the soldier to whom this term should refer is actually just 
a figment of imagination. However, we are inclined to say that the imprisoned sol-
dier is indeed in a certain cognitive state in which he would find himself even if 
this fellow soldier would in fact exist. His utterance is a consequence of that very 
cognitive state. Because of this, it seems that we are required to find some seman-
tic component of this sentence which would be present in the given context, and 
which would be the bearer of cognitive significance (Cf. Wettstein 1986: 187, 191).
The second type of cases includes those circumstances in which a subject is in-
clined to accept as true just one out of the two given sentences. These sentences 
differ from each other only insofar as they include different indexicals. Those in-
dexicals, however, have the same referent in the given context. Hence these sen-
tences express the same proposition. Wettstein provides the following example. 
Let us imagine that a certain person finds herself in a room full of mirrors which 
are so arranged that a person has an illusion that she sees some other person when 
in fact she sees herself. Next, Wettstein humourosly adds that this person notices 
that the person she sees in such a way is about to be mugged by a prominent phi-
losopher of language. In this case, the person in question will be inclined to ac-
cept as true the sentence “She is about to be attacked by a neo-Fregean”, but not 
the sentence “I am about to be attacked by a neo-Fregean”, thinking that there are 
two different persons involved in this situation. In other words, the inclinations to 
accept these two sentences as true are expressions of different cognitive states, so 
these sentences must have different cognitive significance (Wettstein 1986: 187–8).1
In the end, there is the third type od cases. It is quite similiar to the previous 
one, but now the key fact is not that a subject can be inclined to accept as true 
just one out of the two given sentences, but that the beliefs that are manifested in 
these inclinations typically lead to different actions. Let us again take the example 
from the previous paragraph. The beliefs expressed by the acceptance of sentenc-
es “She is about to be attacked by a neo-Fregean” and “I am about to be attacked 
by a neo-Fregean” as true, typically lead to quite different sorts of behaviour. For 
example. in the second case we will be much more prone to act as swiftly as pos-
sible, as a result of the perceived danger then in the first case – that is unless we 
are exceptionally altruistic. Given that invoking certain cognitive states is a basic 
1 Similiar example can be found in Kaplan 1989: 537.
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explanatory strategy in elucidating human action, cognitive states in which a sub-
ject finds herself when accepting these sentences as true can not be the same (Wett-
stein 1986: 188).
With this in mind, for our current purposes the problem of cognitive signifi-
cance could be formulated as the following question – what are the bearers of cog-
nitive significance? Besides that the previously discussed types of cases provide us 
with a motivation for this question, they also show us that a certain, at least prima 
facie solid candidate for an answer to that question, is unacceptable. That candi-
date is a proposition, or to be more precise, a proposition understood in a specif-
ic way. According to this way of understanding propositions – which is in essence 
the  Russel-Kaplanian view of propositions – the constituents of the proposition ex-
pressed by a certain sentence are the referents of the refering terms of that sentence. 
These referents are understood to be the objects to which we attribute something by 
means of accepting the given sentence as true, as well as the properties which are 
attributed to these objects in the same manner. For example, if we look at a tradi-
tional philosophical sentence such as “Socrates is a human being”, the proposition 
expressed by this sentence would have the actual human being Socrates and the 
property od being human as its constituents. If, however, a sentence contains certain 
indexical – as is the case with the sentence “I am a human being” – the constituents 
of proposition expressed by that sentence will depend on the context in which that 
sentence is uttered. If I would be the one to utter it, than I – a human being by the 
name of Filip Čukljević – would be among its constituents (Wettstein 1986: 186–7).2
Why is a proposition understood in such manner not a good candidate for the 
bearer of cognitive significance? Firstly, it does not pass the test set for it by the 
initial type of cases. Namely, given that in the sort of cases we are presented by a 
sentence which includes certain indexical with no referent, that sentence will not 
express a complete proposition. If, however, a proposition is to be the bearer of cog-
nitive significance, a subject could not express any determinate cognitive state by 
accepting the given sentence as true, since it expresses no complete proposition. 
That is, the sentence should have no cognitive significance. But, since a subject does 
express certain determinate cognitive state by accepting this sentence as true, then 
it must have cognitive significance. In short – there is no (complete) proposition, but 
there is cognitive significance, and that is a big problem (Cf. Wettstein 1986: 187).
The remaining types of cases also present a problem for someone who would 
accept the assumption that a Russell-Kaplanian proposition is the bearer of cogni-
tive significance. The pairs of sentences from these two sorts of cases differ from 
each other only insofar as the indexicals they contain are not the same – given that 
these indexicals have the same referent – ergo, (Russell-Kaplanian) propositions 
expressed by these sentences will be identical. However, we have seen that these 
sentences should have distinct cognitive significance, in order to explain the pos-
sibility of accepting one of them as true but not the other – i.e. in order to explain 
typicaly different action that stems from accepting one of these two sentences as 
true. If a proposition is the bearer of cognitive significance, however, these sen-
tences must have the same cognitive significance. The problem here, essentially, is 
2  A bit more information regarding this conception of propositions can be found in Ka-
plan 1989: 500–7, 523–4.
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the identity of expressed propositions acompanied by the difference in their cog-
nitive significance (Cf. Wettstein 1986: 187–8).
The fact that a Russel-Kaplanian proposition can not be the bearer of cogni-
tive significance does not necessarilly mean that a proposition as such can not be 
the bearer of cognitive significance. Frege for sure would not accept such a judge-
ment. He would rather suggest that this failure of a Russel-Kaplanian proposition 
provides us with a reason to discard such view of the nature of propositions. Un-
like those who think that a proposition is constitued by the referents of the reffer-
ing terms which are the parts of the sentence that express the given proposition, 
Frege claims that the real constituents of a proposition are not the referents of the 
apropriate reffering terms, but the senses of these terms. We will not pursue Frege’s 
conception of a sense in more detail here. There will be more discussion about it in 
the next section. Currently, it suffices to say that according to Frege the true bearer 
of cognitive significance is a thought – the term he uses for the proposition – and 
it is in fact the sense of a sentence (Cf. Wettstein 1986: 188).
We will not specifically discuss whether a propositon thus concieved is the true 
bearer of cognitive significance. Here we are not primarily interested in Frege and 
his views on the matter, but in the new theorists of reference, such as Kaplan and 
Perry. These theorists base their theory to a significant extent on the explicit rejec-
tion of Frege’s understanding of propositions and the acceptance of the aforemen-
tioned Russell-Kaplanian theory of propositions (Wettstein 1986: 186–7). However, 
we have seen that a Russell-Kaplanian proposition itself can not be the bearer of 
cognitive significance. A Fregean proposition at least initially seems like a better 
candidate, but that path is not open for the new theorists of reference. That being 
said, if they are of an opinion that the problem of cognitive significance presents a 
genuine problem of philosophical semantics, these theorists must find some other 
candidate for the bearer of cognitive significance.3
Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution to the problem of cognitive significance
Kaplan and Perry claim that the true bearer of cognitive significance is what they 
call a character. Similiarly to Frege’s sense, the character of a term is a certain mode 
of presentation of the referent of that term (Kaplan 1989: 530; Wettstein 1986: 190; 
Wettstein 1988: 23–4).4 A character of an indexical is a certain mode of  presentation 
3 Some of these theorists, like Kaplan and Perry, openly regard this problem as a genuine 
problem of philosophical semantics. Cf. Kaplan 1989: 529–40, Perry 1988: 3–5. On the oth-
er side, Wettstein – for example – in some places claims that it does not present a problem 
for philosophical semantics, but that it might be a problem of some other philosophical 
discipline. Cf. Wettstein 1986: 196–204. However, even Wettstein eventually provides a 
solution to this problem that is, atleast in part, the product of his considerations about 
philosophical semantics. Cf. Wettstein 1988: 22–8. More is to be found about Wettstein’s 
conception of the problem of cognitive significance in the final section of this paper.
4 Certain philosophers, like Gareth Evans, consider this talk about modes of presentation 
of a certain object to be too metaphoric. As a consequence, Evans suggests that instead of 
speaking about different modes of representation of a certain object we should speak about 
particular ways of thinking about certain object. Cf. Evans 1982: 15–7. I think that for the 
purposes of this paper the second way of speaking does not bring considerable benefits 
compared to the first one, so I will stick with the original.
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of an object, while a character of a sentence is a certain mode of presentation of a 
proposition. The relation between a character and a proposition is such that a char-
acter of a sentence, together with a context in which that sentence is uttered, deter-
mines the proposition that is expressed by the given sentence (Kaplan 1989: 505–6).
In contrast to Frege’s sense, a character of some term does not determine its 
referent independently of context, by the means of certain qualitative description 
which is satisfied only by the referent of that term. The character of the term “I”, e.g., 
is expressed by the linguistic rule according to which this term refers to the person 
uttering it. This means that this term, independently of the context, does not refer 
exclusively to one object. That is, this term represents in the same way different 
objects in different contexts, and refers to the specific object only given the specif-
ic context (Kaplan 1989: 505; Wettstein 1986: 190). That being said, the sentence 
“I am hungry” – uttered in the context in which I am the one uttering it – express-
es the proposition that Filip Čukljević is hungry, due to its context and character. 
However, when uttered by John Perry, it expresses the proposition that John Perry 
is hungry. It should also be mentioned that, unlike Frege’s senses, characters are 
not the constituents of propositions. Referents of the terms which form the given 
sentence constitute the proposition expressed by it. The constituents of the previ-
ous propositions are the property of being hungry and myself in the case of the first 
one, and the same property and John Perry in the case of the second proposition.
In Kaplan’s and Perry’s view, characters are simply specific cognitive perspectives 
from which we grasp the given propositions (Kaplan 1989: 530; Wettstein 1986: 
190–1; Wettstein 1988: 24). The same proposition can be grasped from different 
cognitive perspectives, and from the same cognitive perspective – in different con-
texts – different propositions can be grasped (Cf. Kaplan 1989: 524). For example, 
the proposition that Filip Čukljević was born in Belgrade can be grasped by John 
Perry from the particular cognitive perspective if he accepts as true the sentence 
“The author of the paper “The problem of cognitive significance – a solution and 
a critique” was born in Belgrade”, and from another cognitive perspective if he ac-
cepts as true the sentence “You were born in Belgrade” in the context in which he 
is speaking directly to me, having met each other in the street perhaps. The per-
spectives are different because Perry does not need to know that the person he is 
talking to in the street is the author of this text, so here we are faced with sentences 
having different characters while expressing the same proposition.
Having clarified the concept of a character, we must ask in what way do Kaplan 
and Perry use this concept in order to explain the three enigmatic types of cases 
from the previous section. In the first type of cases we have a sentence which ex-
presses no (complete) proposition. However, it does have a certain character. Ut-
tering a sentence like “You are wonderful” is an attempt to represent in a certain 
way an object, or, to be more precise, a person to who we purport to speak to. This 
mode of presentation is present independently of the fact whether the object it 
purports to present actually exists. In this manner, there is a bearer of cognitive 
significance because there is a character (Wettstein 1986: 191).
Concerning the two remaining types of cases, sentences like “She is about to 
be attacked by a neo-Fregean” and “I am about to be attacked by a neo-Fregean”, 
express the same proposition, however they have different characters. Using the 
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terms “she” and “I” obviously goes hand in hand with quite different cognitive 
perspectives. Because of this, these sentences also have different cognitive signif-
icance. The character of the former sentence represents the given proposition in 
a way that a person accepting that sentence as true (more or less) asserts that the 
female person pointed to in that context is about to be attacked by a neo-Fregean. 
The character of the latter sentence does the same thing, in a way that a person 
accepting that sentence as true asserts that the speaker, i.e. she herself, is about to 
be attacked by a neo-Fregean (Wettstein 1986: 191–2). In this manner, Kaplan and 
Perry claim that they, as well as the other new theorists of reference, can indeed 
offer a satisfactory solution to the problem of cognitive significance.
Wettstein’s critique of the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution
Wettstein’s critique of the solution to the problem of cognitive significance pro-
vided by the new theorists of reference, Kaplan and Perry, consists of – roughly 
speaking – two parts. In the first part Wettstein claims that a Russell-Kaplanian 
proposition can not be an adequate bearer of cognitive significance. We have al-
ready discussed the reasons behind this claim in the first section, so we will not 
repeat them here. In the second part Wettstein criticizes the Kaplan’s and Perry’s 
solution, as it is laid out in the previous section. It is important to emphasize that 
Wettstein does not infer from this (alleged) inability of the new theorists of refer-
ence to offer an adequate solution to the problem of cognitive significance, to the 
conclusion that their entire semantic theory is completely wrong. What he does 
infer is that the (originally Frege’s) assumption that all of these theorists share, and 
according to which the problem of cognitive significance belongs to the domain od 
philosophical semantics, is wrong (Cf. Wettstein 1986: 200–4). In the last section 
we will see exactly in what way this Wettstein’s claim is to be understood. Before 
doing that, Wettstein’s argument in favour of this claim should be completely ex-
posed. That is, his critique of the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution must be presented.
Wettstein considers the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution to the problem of cogni-
tive significance, as displayed in the previous section, to be inadequate solution to 
that problem. Wettstein’s critique of this solution consists of two parts. In the first 
one he criticizes the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution when applied to the sentences 
which contain proper names.5 Since in this paper we have focused on the sentences in 
which indexicals occur, we will not elaborate upon this part of Wettstein’s critique.6
In the second part Wettstein criticizes the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution when 
applied to sentences which include indexicals. It is interesting to notice here that 
Perry, whose defense from Wettstein’s critique will be the topic of the next sec-
tion, almost completely ignores this second part of Wettstein’s critique. Namely, 
it seems that Perry is suggesting that Wettstein’s critique of the new theorists of 
reference is completely based on their inability to explain the possibility of differ-
ence in cognitive significance by using the concept of (expressed) proposition (Perry 
1988: 2–3). Wettstein, however, besides this principled critique of the new theorists 
5 Proper names are those terms which pick out a unique object in the world to which they 
refer. Some examples are personal names, names of places, etc.
6 More about this part of critique can be seen in Wettstein 1986: 192–5.
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of reference, explicitely criticizes the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution to this prob-
lem which makes use of the concept of character. According to Wettstein, the key 
problem with this solution is the case of synonymous sentences (sentences with the 
same linguistic meaning, i.e. character) which have different cognitive significance.
Let us take a slightly modified Wettstein’s example with the sentence “She is 
about to be attacked”. Suppose there is a certain person who finds herself at the 
rock concert. From a certain angle at the spot where the concert is taking place, 
that person sees unusually dressed rock singer (a reader can choose her or his fa-
vourite). After awhile, the person gets lost in that strange place and, thinking that 
she ended up at some different rock concert, she just changes a point of view from 
which she sees the same rock singer. However, from this new angle the singer ap-
pears like a completely different person, due to her unusual costume and makeup. 
Moreover, from this new angle the lost concertgoer sees that an unkown person is 
getting ready to attack our beloved rock singer.
This scenario presents a serious problem for the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution 
to the problem of cognitive significance. The person, before she gets lost, is not in-
clined to accept as true the sentence “She is about to be attacked” while pointing to 
the rock singer. However, after she gets lost and again sees the singer – now from a 
different point of view – she will be inclined to accept that sentence as true while 
pointing to the same singer. It is crucial to emphasize that this person – the lost 
fan of rock music – does not know that in both cases she is seeing the same singer. 
So she did not lose her initial belief that the singer is not about to be attacked (due 
to circumstances seeming completely normal and her having no reason to believe 
something like that is likely to happen), but she retained it while forming another 
belief – that the singer she currently sees, and who she believes is different from 
the first one, is about to be attacked.
The main problem which this example presents, according to Wettstein, is not 
the fact that two different utterances of the given sentence express the same prop-
osition while they have different cognitive significance, as Perry understands it (Cf. 
Perry 1988: 2–3). The real problem is that this sentence in these two cases has the 
same character but different cognitive significance. If the given person would be 
inclined to accept that sentence as true in both cases, she would do it by means of 
the same mode of presentation of the proposition which that sentence expresses. 
In both cases by the means of uttering the sentence “She is about to be attacked” 
she would (more or less) claim that the female person pointed to is about to be at-
tacked. The disposition to accept different utterances of this sentence as true could 
also lead to different action, if our scenario were enriched in an adequate way. So 
the Wettstein’s point is the following – the Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution does not 
actually explain certain possible circumstances which fall under the second and 
third type of problematic cases, which means that a character can not be the bear-
er of cognitive significance (Cf. Wettstein 1986: 195–6).
Perry’s answer to the Wettstein’s critique
Perry begins his answer to the previous critique by enumerating certain conditions 
which, according to him, Wettstein holds that the bearer of cognitive significance 
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must satisfy. There is no need to enlist these conditions here, because they will 
not play an important role in evaluating how succesfull Perry’s answer is.7 The 
main point of the enumeration of these conditions is that – and Perry agrees with 
Wettstein here – they can not be satisfied by the concept of proposition which is 
expressed by a certain sentence, or, to be more precise, by the utterance of that 
sentence (Perry 1988: 5–6). However, Perry thinks that Wettstein infers directly 
from this fact that the problem of cognitive significance does not belong to the 
domain of philosophical semantics (Perry 1988: 3). As we have already seen, this is 
simply not the case, because Wettstein also considers adequacy of the solution to 
this problem which makes use of the concept of character, not of the concept of 
proposition. But let us stay with the Perry’s reading of Wettstein’s critique for now.
Appearing to have quickly abandoned the concept of character, Perry now 
holds that Wettstein’s critique ignores the distinction between the two sorts of 
propositions. One sort consists of those propositions which are expressed by cer-
tain utterances, and Perry agrees that they can not be the bearers of cognitive sig-
nificance. However, Perry is of the opinion that there exists another sort of prop-
ositions, whose specimens do in fact satisfy Wettstein’s conditions for the bearer 
of cognitive significance. This sort of propositions Perry calls propositions which 
are  created by utterance (Perry 1988: 8).
What is the difference between these two sorts of propositions? Propositions 
which are expressed by utterance are identical with – by now familiar – Rus-
sell-Kaplanian propositions. The utterance of the sentence “I am F” by the subject 
S expresses the proposition that S has the property F. On the other hand, a prop-
osition which is created by a certain utterance U is the proposition that the truth 
conditions of the utterance U are satisfied (Perry 1988: 7–8). If we consider previ-
ous example, S’s utterance “I am F” creates the proposition that the truth condi-
tions of the utterance “I am F” are satisfied in the context in which that utterance 
is uttered. These conditions are satisfied iff the context in which the given utter-
ance is uttered is such that the utterance is uttered by a subject who has the prop-
erty F. In this manner, unlike the proposition which is expressed by the previous 
utterance U, the proposition which is created by that utterance does not have sub-
ject S as its constituent, but the utterance U instead (Perry 1988: 7). That is, by the 
means of this created proposition we do not claim something about subject S, but 
about utterance U. Perry holds that the bearer of cognitive significance is, in fact, 
this created proposition of his (Perry 1988: 8).
In what way would Perry answer to the Wettstein’s counterexample with the 
sentence “She is about to be attacked”, bearing in mind this theory of the bearers 
of cognitive significance? Although he does not say it explicitly, the following an-
swer seems to be the only reasonable one. Namely, two different utterances of that 
sentence – despite the fact that in their respective contexts they express the same 
proposition – do not create the same proposition. The reason for this is quite  simple 
– since these utterances are the constituents of the propositions they create, and 
these are two different utterances, as they are uttered at different times and places 
– the created propositions will be different.
7 These conditions can be found in Perry 1988: 6.
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The reason for Perry’s lack of enthusiasm about this type of response might be 
the following. It seems that this answer to the question – how is it possible for the 
two utterances of the same sentence, which in their respective contexts express 
the same proposition, to have different cognitive significance – at the bottom line 
comes to this. It is possible because these are two different utterances. This response 
obviously does not look especially satisfactory, due to its not being particularly in-
formative. It appears that the difference in cognitive significance is explained by 
the difference in created propositions which are its bearers, while the difference 
in the created propositions in turn is explained by the (numerical) difference in 
utterances which create these propositions. Therefore, it is hard to see which ex-
planatory role the concept of created proposition actually has. It is difficult to use 
it in providing sufficiently interesting answer to the question – why the difference 
in utterances is relevant to the difference in cognitive significance. Perry does not 
give any sugestions as to how we could manage this problem.
This might be the reason why Perry formulates his solution to the previous prob-
lem in a different way. He is quite concise about it – it is possible that these two ut-
terances have different cognitive significance because the person who utters them, 
as well as the one who hears them, does not need to know that the term “she” in both 
cases refers to the same person (Cf. Perry 1988: 11). Perry argues that an analogous 
explanation can be offered for the problematic cases in which, instead of corefer-
ential indexicals, there are coreferential proper names. This, he claims, is true of 
the classic case in which it is possible at the same time to accept as true sentence 
“Cicero is F”, but not to accept as true sentence “Tully is F”. Perry explains this by 
asserting that in order to be linguisticaly competent, i.e. to be able to understand 
and use these names – as well as the previously mentioned indexicals – we do not 
need to know that they have the same referent (Cf. Perry 1988: 12–5). This sort of 
explanation makes use of neither the concept of created proposition nor the con-
cept of character, and it seems considerably more plausible then the explanations 
we have been dealing with in the previous paragraphs, which do use one or the 
other of these concepts. However, to what extent is such a response to the Wett-
stein’s critique satisfying? We will deal with this question in the next, final section.
The success of Perry’s answer to the Wettstein’s critique
Well, to what extent then is Perry’s response to the Wettstein’s critique satisfying? 
I believe that it is to large extent unsatisfying. First, we must consider a bit more 
carefully what is exactly the conclusion of Wettstein’s critique, i.e. what does he 
actually mean by the claim that the problem of cognitive significance does not be-
long to the domain of philosophical semantics. I think that the best interpretation 
of this Wettstein’s claim is the following one. For start, Wettstein does not claim 
that the problem of cognitive significance does not belong to the domain of philos-
ophy of language. Philosophical semantics presents just one subfield of philosophy 
of language. This is a subfield which deals with, traditionally speaking, the relation 
between the language and the world. That is, with meaning. There are other sub-
fields of philosophy of language, such as philosophical pragmatics for example, of 
which more will be presented shortly.
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Therefore, Wettstein does not claim that the problem of cognitive significance 
does not belong to philosophy of language, but only that it does not belong to the 
one particular domain within it. However, what does it exactly mean to say that 
the problem of cognitive significance does not belong to philosophical semantics? 
I think that in Wettstein’s view this means that the cognitive significance should 
not be identified with some semantic component of terms or sentences, atleast not 
as an inital assumption. Russell-Kaplanian propositions, Fregean thoughts and Ka-
plan’s and Perry’s characters are concepts which are supposed to express certain 
part of the meaning of sentences and terms, and which are to be used to clarify 
the relation between language and extralinguistic reality. That is why all of these 
concepts are semantic components.
Wettstein, however, argues that the advantage of Kaplan’s and Perry’s solution 
over the initial Russell-Kaplanian and Fregean options consists in their rejection of 
Frege’s assumption, which some of the new theorists of reference share, according 
to which the bearer of cognitive significance must be the proposition. Wettstein 
holds that this is the first step in the right direction, but that it should not be the 
last one (Cf. Wettstein 1986: 196–7). Since they think that the bearer of cognitive 
significance is a character, Kaplan and Perry retain the assumption that some sort 
of semantic component has to be the bearer of cognitive significance.
Wettstein rejects this assumption. It could be said that Wettstein would think 
that formulating the problem of cognitive significance in the form of the question 
– what are the bearers of cognitive significance – is misleading, because it pre-
suposses that there must be something like a bearer of cognitive significance. And 
if there are certain bearers of cognitive significance, then it seems natural to seek 
for them inside the limits of the meaning of terms. Hence, in my opinion, Wett-
stein would be more prone to formulate the given problem in the following, more 
neutral, manner – how is it possible for a subject to be inclined to accept as true 
just one utterance out of the given two in the second type of problematic cases 
(due to simplicity we will not deal with the remaining types of cases at this point)? 
Wettstein’s response to this question is essentially the same as the one which Perry 
eventually comes up with. A competent language-speaker can be able to understand 
and to use indexicals, proper names, etc. while not knowing whether they are mu-
tually coreferential. Wettstein is here motivated by a more general story about the 
rejection of representationalism in philosophical semantics, which is a too broad 
topic to be dealt with here.8
In any case, in this type of explanation we make no use of any specific seman-
tic component as the bearer of cognitive significance. Indeed, we would rather say 
that there are actually no bearers of cognitive significance. That is why this problem 
does not belong to philosophical semantics, but it rather belongs to philosophical 
pragmatics. Philosophical pragmatics deals with, traditionaly speaking, the rela-
tion between the language and its speakers. Inter alia, it deals with the conditions 
which a speaker needs to satisfy in order to be able to understand and to use certain 
terms. These two subfields of philosophy of language are surely not completely mu-
tually independent. In the case of Wettstein’s solution to the problem of cognitive 
8 More about this can be found in Wettstein 1988: 22–8.
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significance, philosophical pragmatics is motivated right by philosophical seman-
tics itself. One of the basic reasons why a speaker does not need to know wheth-
er the terms she uses are mutually coreferential is the fact that these terms refer 
directly to their referents, not indirectly by the means of some specific cognitive 
perspective, like Frege’e sense for example.9
Once we have in mind what has been said in the last couple of paragraphs, Per-
ry’s defense from the Wettstein’s critique seems quite unconvincing. First, it ap-
pears that he identifies philosophical semantics with philosophy of language tout 
court, which leads to – as we have seen – the misguided and incorrect interpre-
tation of Wettstein’s conclusion (Cf. Perry 1988: 3–5). Next, Perry’s claim that the 
created propositions are the bearers of cognitive significance is problematic for a 
couple of reasons. One reason is that such an explanation is not informative, as we 
have already discussed. The second reason is the following. If the created proposi-
tions are the bearers of cognitive significance, it should not be possible for a case 
in which there are two different utterances which have the same cognitive signif-
icance to exist. Any two utterances, just by the fact that there are two of them, are 
different from each other, hence they create different propositions. However, in 
this case any two different utterances of a sentence like “Belgrade is the capital of 
Serbia” or “I was born in Belgrade” would have different cognitive significance for 
one and the same subject. This looks highly improbable. If in normal circumstanc-
es a subject (me, for example) accepts as true utterances of one of these sentences 
which are uttered in an interval of just a few seconds, how are we to explain their 
having different cognitive significance for that subject? Perhaps this might not be 
necessarily impossible to do, but Perry offers no sugestions as to how to do this, 
atleast in principle.
Ultimately, as we have already noticed, Perry himself does not explain either 
the second or the third type of problematic cases by using the concept of created 
proposition. Rather, he appeals to the fact that a speaker does not need to know 
almost anything concerning the referent of a term she uses in order to be able to 
understand that term. To say it again, this explanation is essentially the same as 
the one given by Wettstein. It makes no use of the concepts of (expressed) propo-
sition, created proposition, character, etc. Therefore, Wettstein’s solution appears 
as superior when compared to Perry’s, in so far as it has (atleast) the same amount 
of explanatory power, while it makes no use of the concepts which have no real 
explanatory role – which is the main problem of Perry’s explanation.
Because of all the mentioned reasons, I argue that Perry’s response to the Wett-
stein’s critique is not convincing. Looking at it more broadly, I am of the opinion 
that Wettstein is right when he suggests that the solution to the problem of cogni-
tive significance should not be searched for in the framework of philosophical se-
mantics. Semantic considerations are relevant, but the area in which the ultimate 
solution to this problem is to be found is, in the first place, philosophical pragmat-
ics. Nevertheless, more earnest consideration of this topic has to be the subject of 
some other research.
9 Wettstein himself nowhere says that the problem of cognitive significance belongs to 
the domain of philosophical pragmatics, not semantics, but I strongly believe that his at-
titude towards the given problem is best expressed in this way. Cf. Wettstein 1988: 22–8.
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Filip Čukljević
Problem saznajne vrednosti – jedno rešenje i jedna kritika
Apstrakt
U ovom radu baviću se rešenjem problema saznajne vrednosti koje nude takozvani novi te-
oretičari referencije, kao i kritikom tog rešenja od strane Hauarda Vetstajna (Howard Wett-
stein). Tvrdiću da je odgovor na tu kritiku koju pruža Džon Peri (John Perry) nedovoljno ubed-
ljiv. Najpre ću razjasniti neke relevantne pojmove, da bih onda na jasan način predstavio sam 
problem saznajne vrednosti. Potom ću prikazati rešenje datog problema koje nude Peri i 
Dejvid Kaplan (David Kaplan). Nakon toga, izložiću Vetstajnovu kritiku tog rešenja. Zatim ću 
analizirati i Perijev pokušaj odbrane od ove kritike. Naposletku, razmotriću u kojoj meri je 
Perijev pokušaj uspešan. Pokazaće se kako on to u značajnoj meri nije.
Ključne reči: saznajna vrednost, propozicija, referent, misao, smisao, karakter, semantika, 
pragmatika
